



Improvements in Aviation Safety Through the Use of SRTM Data Products

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**NASA Langley Research Center
The Shuttle Radar Topography Mission
Data Validation and Applications Workshop
Reston, Virginia
June 14-16, 2005**




Topics

- : Aviation Safety
- : Synthetic Vision Systems
- : Aeronautical Database Standards
- : SRTM Data Product Applicability
- : Data Integrity
- : Summary



Aviation Safety



*Ref: Boeing data (1990-1999)

Air China Boeing 767-200, April 15 2002

Pusan, South Korea

128 fatalities, 39 survivors including a pilot



CONTROLLED FLIGHT INTO TERRAIN (CFIT)

Air China flight 129 ploughed into a 1,000 ft **mountain** as it was preparing to land in **heavy fog and rain**. The pilot stated that he "felt **no plane malfunction** before the crash".



Near Martha's Vineyard July 16, 1999

Piper Saratoga PA-32R-301

3 fatalities



LOSS OF HORIZON

The low-time non-instrument rated pilot departed at night in VFR conditions. Cause of the accident was determined to be the pilot's **failure to maintain control** during descent over water at night; the result of **spatial disorientation**. Factors in the accident were haze and the dark night.





Geospatial Data in Aviation*

: Cockpit-based Applications

- Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (TAWS)
- Off-airway “drift-down” protection
- Emergency landing site location selection
- Synthetic Vision Systems (SVS)

: Ground-based Applications

- Minimum Safe Altitude Warning Systems (MSAW)
- Instrument procedure design
- Engine-out procedure analysis
- Training
 - flight simulation
 - mission rehearsal



*Ref: RTCA DO-276, EUROCAE ED-119



SVS Flight Deck Concepts






SVS Flight Trials (EGE)






SVS Flight Trials (WAL)



SVS Flight Trials (RNO)





SVS Implementation Status

- : Multiple demonstrations on various platforms
- : FAA Advisory Circular in final draft
- : Chelton product certified
- : Others in the works
 - Honeywell, Rockwell-Collins, BAE Systems, Universal Avionics
- : Data integrators developing infrastructure, processes, and test databases
 - Boeing-Jeppesen
 - Eurocontrol (EAD)



Aeronautical Database Standards

Quality and Content

- : *User Requirements for Aerodrome Mapping Information*, RTCA DO-272, EUROCAE ED-99, October, 2001
- : *User Requirements for Terrain and Obstacle Data*, RTCA DO-276, EUROCAE ED-98, December, 2001
- : RevA versions to be published this summer (2005)


Exchange Model

- : *Interchange Standards for Terrain, Obstacle, and Aerodrome Mapping Data*, RTCA DO-291, EUROCAE ED-119, June, 2004
- : Based on ISO 19100 series of standards


Processing

- : *Standards for Processing Aeronautical Data*, RTCA DO-200A, EUROCAE ED-76, September, 1998

www.rtca.org, www.eurocae.org



Terrain Database Requirements*



Metadata: area of coverage, source identifier, acquisition method, post spacing, reference system, horizontal/vertical accuracy and confidence level, [elevation reference](#), recorded surface, [integrity](#), date/timestamp, surface type (opt), penetration (opt), known variations (opt)

*Ref: RTCA DO-276, EUROCAE ED-119



International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

- : RTCA/EUROCAE requirements used as basis to amend existing ICAO requirements for navigation databases to include terrain and obstacle data
- : Requires 188 member states (i.e. countries) to provide/maintain terrain and obstacle databases as they do with navigation data today
- : Compliance required by...
 - 2008 (Area 1 and CAT II/III Area)
 - 2010 (Area 2 and Airport Surface)

www.icao.org



SRTM Data Applicability

: RTCA considered SRTM data products to create Area 1 specs

- Near world-wide coverage
- Adequate post spacing and quality
- Consistent data source
- "Publicly" available

: SRTM technical issues

- Thinned 3" dataset hides max elev within grid cells
- Method of filling voids (including V&V) must be established and consistently applied
- First surface may need land cover map for proper interpretation

: Other products of use


- Peaks data; water boundaries; obstacle data
- Metadata: has data been checked against independent source

: Civil vs Military "political" issue looms...

SRTM data availability issues (restrictions) may need to be overcome for global ICAO requirements to be achievable thereby enabling envisioned aviation safety improvements


Integrity

: Integrity is the primary issue facing the use of any data, including SRTM products, in aviation applications.




For example, if you don't leave the ramp, $Pr[MTI]=0!$

Intended Function Drives Integrity Requirements



SVS displays are intended to replace existing primary flight displays and will be used for navigational purposes (i.e. **flight-critical** in IMC)



TAWS displays are intended to provide terrain awareness only and are not to be used for navigational purposes (i.e. **advisory**)




DEM Integrity


How can we get it?

- : Quality source data
- : Certified life-cycle process
- : In-flight monitoring


100 meter post-spacing



1 meter post-spacing





Source: DFRC ALTM Mission



Source: US Army

In-flight Monitoring

- : Use sensor measurements to confirm terrain model quality
- : When significant differences occur, inform the pilot and/or log for maintenance action



$$P(\text{loss of integrity}) = P(\text{data error leads to MTI}) * P(\text{missed detection})$$



Summary

- : Quality terrain models can directly impact the safety of aviation operations
- : SVS and TAWS allow pilots to interpret the terrain environment in real-time
- : Standards specific to aviation have been published for geospatial data
- : SRTM products are expected to be used to meet Area 1 (en-route) requirements
- : Data integrity is the biggest open issue
 - Driven by “intended function”